The future of renewable energy auctions: scenarios and pathways by Woodman, B & Fitch-Roy, O
 
   


















D7.3, October 2020 
 
The future of 
renewable energy 
auctions 



































D7.3, October 2020, The future of renewable energy auctions - Scenarios 
and pathways 
Authors: Bridget Woodman and Oscar Fitch-Roy (UNEXE) 
Reviewed by: Vasilios Anatolitis (Fraunhofer ISI) 
Submission date: 30 October 2020 (M24) 
Project start date: 01 November 2018 
Work Package: WP7 
Work Package leader: Fraunhofer ISI 
Dissemination level: PU (Public) 
 
Any dissemination of results reflects only the authors’ view and the European Commission Horizon 2020 is 
not responsible for any use that may be made of the information Deliverable D7.3 contains. 
  
 3  
Contents 
1 Background to this study: a changing role for renewable energy support .....................................................6 
2 Introduction to scenario analysis ............................................................................................................................6 
3 Methods and data ................................................................................................................................................... 12 
4 Scenarios for the future of auctions .................................................................................................................... 14 
5 Two dimensions ...................................................................................................................................................... 16 
5.1 Axis 1: flexibility .............................................................................................................................................. 16 
5.1.1 Indicators .................................................................................................................................................... 17 
5.2 Axis 2: decentralisation ................................................................................................................................. 18 
5.2.1 Indicators .................................................................................................................................................... 18 
6 Four scenarios ......................................................................................................................................................... 19 
6.1 Top-down tech (High flexibility, low decentralisation) ............................................................................ 21 
6.1.1 Characteristics ........................................................................................................................................... 21 
6.1.2 Storyline ...................................................................................................................................................... 21 
6.1.3 Implications for RES auctions ................................................................................................................ 21 
6.2 Shiny happy energy citizens (high flexibility, high decentralisation) .................................................... 22 
6.2.1 Characteristics ........................................................................................................................................... 22 
6.2.2 Storyline ...................................................................................................................................................... 22 
6.2.3 Implications for RES auctions ................................................................................................................ 23 
6.3 Leviathan (low flexibility, low decentralisation) ........................................................................................ 23 
6.3.1 Characteristics ........................................................................................................................................... 23 
6.3.2 Storyline ...................................................................................................................................................... 23 
6.3.3 Implications for RES auctions ................................................................................................................ 24 
6.4 Make-do-and-mend (low flexibility, high decentralisation) .................................................................... 25 
6.4.1 Characteristics ........................................................................................................................................... 25 
6.4.2 Storyline ...................................................................................................................................................... 25 
6.4.3 Implications for RES auctions ................................................................................................................ 25 
7 Analysis: pathways and implications for RES auctions ................................................................................... 26 
  
 4  
7.1 Public RES auction guaranteeing supplements to private revenues ................................................... 26 
7.2 Corporate or community PPA ..................................................................................................................... 26 
7.3 Return of the feed-in tariff ............................................................................................................................ 27 
7.4 Merchant contracting ................................................................................................................................... 27 
8 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................. 28 
References ........................................................................................................................................................................ 29 
Appendix 1: Webinar on the Future of Renewable Energy Auctions (7 October 2020) ...................................... 31 
Profile of external attendees ..................................................................................................................................... 31 
Responses to questions in the webinar .................................................................................................................. 31 




 5  
Table of tables 
Table 1: Overview of major qualitative energy scenario exercises ............................................................................8 
 
Table of figures 
Figure 1: qualitative scenario production process ..................................................................................................... 12 
Figure 2: Task 7.2 timeline ............................................................................................................................................. 13 
Figure 3: Long list of 'drivers' of electricity system change relevant to RES auctions ........................................ 14 
Figure 4: First list of themes .......................................................................................................................................... 15 
Figure 5: Set of axes and worlds emerging from consortium workshop .............................................................. 15 
Figure 6: Flexibility indicators as presented by Papaefthymiou et al. (Papaefthymiou et al. 2018) ................. 17 
Figure 7: Scenario framework overview ...................................................................................................................... 19 
Figure 8: Components of auction model illustrations ............................................................................................... 20 
Figure 9: A merchant system in which wholesale electricity markets can enable adequate risk management
 ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 22 
Figure 10: An auction system in which private (or corporate) PPAs are auctioned with little or no public or 
regulatory input. ............................................................................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 11: Auction system in which privately organised auctions are subject to some degree of regulatory 
oversight of design – particularly to ensure actor and technology diversity ........................................................ 23 
Figure 12: Auction system in which private corporations are legally compelled to increase procurement of 
RES auctions through mandated auction programmes ........................................................................................... 24 








 6  
1 Background to this study: a changing role for renewable 
energy support 
In the last few years, auctions have becoming the predominant policy instrument for securing and managing 
RES deployment in Europe. Auctions simultaneously address a number of market failures, including 
wholesale electricity remuneration rates that are often lower than production costs and prohibitive risk 
premia associated with volatile wholesale electricity markets. Auctions also protect society from the 
immediate costs of over-rewarding renewable generators and system costs of uncontrolled RES expansion. 
However, the role played by renewable energy technologies is determined by the broader context in which 
they are embedded, which is likely to change in the coming decades. The value that renewable generators 
can realise through participating in markets will influence whether RES auctions are appropriate and, if they 
are, the most suitable design. The value of RES output and therefore the role of auctions may be subject to 
significant change between today and 2030 and beyond. 
In particular, evolutions in market design and network regulation will have a profound effect on the cost of 
producing and integrating renewable electricity in the future electricity system. The ‘routes to market’ 
available to producers of renewable electricity will be determined by the products can be exchanged and by 
how costs are allocated among generators, network operators, consumers, taxpayers and others. 
For example, the future status of issues such as degree of market liberalisation, grid congestion and 
constrained output, balancing charges and trading arrangements, as well as the system value of renewables 
generation, will together define whether or not renewable electricity production can be conducted profitably. 
The future condition of markets and networks is therefore central to the issue of whether subsidies awarded 
through auctions (or otherwise) can or should be removed, changed or reduced over time. 
For that reason, what we understand auctions to be will likely also evolve.  Current expectations of who is 
likely to bid, who the auctioneer might be, and what is being auctioned will shift in the future as a response 
to changing market and system conditions.  For that reason, we have adopted a broad definition of what is 
meant by ‘auction’ to include as many potential future configurations as possible.  This definition is that a 
RES auction comprises: a scarce number of agreements giving a route to market for electricity production 
allocated through a competitive, largely bid price-driven ranking process 
Increased levels of renewables penetration are already leading to changes in the functioning of electricity 
markets and the operation and planning of networks. Adoptions of other technologies and practices such as 
e-mobility, battery storage greater use of demand-side flexibility and improved energy efficiency will 
accelerate this change. Some of the changes are driven by policy decisions taken at various levels while 
others emerge from organic, bottom-up processes. Governance arrangements such as the delegation of 
responsibility to the local level and the scope for action of distribution networks are important factors in 
enabling, shaping or inhibiting change.  
At all levels of policymaking there are ongoing discussions about future developments such as the 
emergence of more local energy markets, and more active management of low-voltage distribution networks, 
both of which could be more supportive of renewable technologies than the current, more centralised model, 
reducing overall system costs and reshaping routes to market for renewable energy. As a result, there are 
many uncertainties about how future electricity systems may look, and many possible trajectories for the co-
evolution of markets, networks and renewable technologies. This task has generated qualitative scenarios 
as a way of thinking about the future using these drivers to think about future electricity system development. 
The aim is to inform debates about what the implications of market and network design and operation might 
be for the future viability of renewables, and therefore how auctions might evolve over time.  
The objective of this document is to initiate and structure a debate with stakeholders in RES auction design 
and implementation in Europe about the future of the instrument through the creation and analysis of 
qualitative scenarios.  It is expected that it will be of use for policy makers and auction designers considering 
future auction design options, as well as businesses who wish to consider how auctions might evolve in 
response to future system and market conditions. 
As a last note, this report was produced during the Covid-19 pandemic.  This means that the degree to which 
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expert stakeholder input into its production has been curtailed to an extent, particularly at the end of the 
scenario production process.  Instead of face to face interviews and a workshop with stakeholders as 
originally planned, we instead organised a webinar in October 2020 to allow interested parties to comment 
on a draft of the report.  Feedback from the webinar has been incorporated into this final report.   
Covid-19 has had a profound impact on electricity systems, both in terms of overall demand and patterns of 
consumption.  It is likely that this will have knock-on impacts on the frequency and size of future auctions in 
the short term, although the longer term focus of this report (2030/2050) means that we have not explicitly 
incorporated Covid-19 impacts in the final discussion and analysis. 
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2 Introduction to scenario analysis 
Qualitative scenarios are tools to help decision making about an uncertain and complex future (Wilkinson et 
al. 2013). They are increasingly being used to guide policy making in the context of long term commitments 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions up to 2050. 
Scenario analysis is not a prediction about what the future will be, but rather about what a plausible future 
might be, based on informed judgements about key drivers for system development and – in the context of 
electricity systems - certain commitments (eg 2030/2050 emissions reduction targets). Unlike more 
quantitative approaches, qualitative scenarios concentrate on possible future socio-economic and -political 
conditions rather than specific technical or economic parameters (Amer et al. 2013; Söderholm et al. 2011). 
The scenarios presented here are developed on the basis of intuitive logics (MacKay and Stoyanova 2017; 
Wack 1985), based around decision making in uncertain social, economic, technical and political conditions. 
Once a set of qualitative scenarios has been constructed, quantitative modelling techniques can be applied 
to examine in detail the technical and economic implications of each storyline (Fortes et al. 2015). 
Clearly the future can involve infinite different possibilities for change, especially in the medium to long term 
Scenario analysis tends to reduce the infinite possibilities by identifying key trends and drivers (C. . Varum 
and Melo 2010; Walton et al. 2019). While this can be criticized as limiting the scope of analysis, and can fail 
to take account of ‘unknown unknowns’ such as Covid 19, it does at least constrain the range of futures to 
trends which can relatively easily be accepted by policy makers as ‘plausible’ (Swart et al. 2004). In electricity 
systems, where change can be slow because of sunk costs and infrastructure commitments, the approach 
could be seen as appropriate for timescales up to 2050, which is the limit of this exercise. 
Scenario analysis is an increasingly common technique used to think strategically about the development of 
energy systems, not least by enhancing understanding of processes and connections, and by providing a 
means to challenge conventional thinking (Wright et al. 2013). Scenario analysis can be useful for identifying 
possible future system discontinuities and their implications as well as examining the potential 
consequences of policy or regulatory decisions over time (Amer et al. 2013). Arguably the application of 
scenario thinking to energy system development began with Royal Dutch Shell at the end of the 1960s, when 
their use is credited with positioning the company to take strategic advantage of the 1973 oil crisis (Wack 
1985). More recently, qualitative scenario analysis techniques have been employed by the World Energy 
Council (World Energy Council 2019), ENTSO-E and ENTSOG (Entsog and Entso-e 2020) , and at a national 
level by the UK’s National Grid Company (National Grid 2019) amongst others. Each of the reports presents 
narrative storylines about what the future energy world might look like, and then considers the technical, 
economic, social and political implications of this. A brief outline of the scenarios is given in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of major qualitative energy scenario exercises 
ENTSOG/ENTSO-E (2020) Ten Year Network Development Plan 2020 Scenario Report 
European focused scenarios exploring the interactions between gas and electricity networks up to 2050 as 
part of the ENTSOs’ Ten Year Network Development Plan process 
Method: 
 
Framed by the 1.5°C Paris Agreement targets. Assumes further 
development of gas and electricity sector coupling as a route to 
decarbonisation. The key drivers in the scenario storylines are 
decarbonisation (low to high ambition), and centralization vs 
decentralization. Scenarios also incorporate national TSO data for short 
term (up to 2025) developments. The storylines are used as the basis of 
quantitative modelling of future energy mix, demand and network use. 
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Scenarios 3 storylines: 
National Trends 
Central scenario based on draft Member States National Energy and 
Climate Plans (NECP) submitted to the European Commission. Complies 
with the EU 2030 Climate and Energy Framework and the 2050 Long Term 
Strategy 80-95% CO2 reduction target by 2050. 
Global Ambition 
Complies with EU 2030 climate targets and 1.5°C Paris Agreement target. 
Led by the development of centralized generation, including offshore wind. 
Distributed Energy 
Complies with 1.5°C Paris Agreement target and ‘considers’ EU 2030 
target. Led by energy decentralization, strong growth in renewables and the 
emergence of strong prosumer participation. 
World Energy Council World Energy Scenarios 2019 
First introduced in 2016, setting out three ‘plausible’ scenarios for energy system development up to 2060. 
The scenarios were updated in 2019 with a focus on the role of innovation up to 2040. The emphasis is on 
focusing decision makers’ thinking towards new consumer behaviours, new business models and the 
implications of non-energy and/or disruptive innovations. 
Method Horizon scanning and a workshop in April 2018, followed by a series of 
interviews and regional workshops to identify emerging trends used to 
update the 2016 scenarios. The three storylines are used as the basis of 
quantitative modelling of energy supply and demand. 
Scenarios Modern Jazz 
Market led, digitally disrupted world led by innovation. Fast but uneven 
economic growth. Clean energy access on the global and local scales, 
bringing with it new challenges for system integration, cybersecurity and 
data privacy. 
Unfinished Symphony 
Co-ordinated, policy-led world with long term planning and united global 
action to develop a low carbon future and meet other challenges. Strong 
commitment to addressing climate change at the sub-national level, and 
an increased emphasis on the broader sustainability agenda. 
Hard Rock 
Fragmented world with inward looking policies, less growth and less global 
cooperation. In the light of the rise of populism and uncertainty about 
international cooperation this is no longer seen as an extreme scenario in 
the 2019 iteration. 
National Grid Company Future Energy Scenarios 
Framed by the UK Government’s 2008 commitment to achieve 80% reductions in GHG emissions by 20501. 
Although the four scenarios were developed by the electricity system operator, they reflect possible changes 
                                                             
1 This commitment was updated in June2019 to achieving net zero emissions by 2050 
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across the whole energy system. The framing drivers used for scenario development are the degree to 
which energy systems become decentralized, and the speed at which decarbonisation is achieved. Two 
of the scenarios meet the 80%/2050 target, while the other two miss it. 
 Community Renewables 
Local energy schemes emerge, and consumer engagement is very high. 
There is a high level of policy support, matched by high economic growth 
and innovation. The 80%/2050 target is met 
Two Degrees 
Very high levels of policy support drive the deployment of centralised 
renewables, as well as carbon capture and storage options. There is very 
high economic growth, but less consumer engagement and energy 
efficiency measures than in Community Renewables. The 80%/2050 target 
is met 
Steady Progression 
Less innovation and consumer engagement as a result of lower policy 
support and economic growth mean that decarbonisation progresses 
slowly, particularly in the transport and heat sectors. The 80%/2050 target 
is missed 
Consumer Evolution 
A lack of strong policy means that innovation is low. While there is some 
shift towards local generation and more consumer engagement from the 
2040s onwards, the change is too slow to allow the 80%/2050 target to be 
met. 
SET-Nav SET-Nav Pathways 
Developed to support strategic decision making in the EU’s energy systems up to 2050. The key drivers 
used to frame the four scenarios were the level of cooperation between system actors across the EU and 
the degree of system decentralisation. The extent to which decarbonisation takes place is assumed across 
all scenarios and is guided by EU targets and other research.  
 Diversification 
Greater cooperation and integration between EU member states and an 
emphasis on renewables lead to increased decentralisation and regulatory 
support for new entrants to challenge the incumbents. Increased 
digitisation is needed for system coordination.  
Directed Vision 
Driven by a shared vision of a greater energy union, the policy and 
regulatory frameworks for system development is stable and widely 
endorsed by stakeholders. Priority areas are large scale renewables, CCS 
nuclear power and energy efficiency. 
Localisation 
Decentralisation is a key characteristic, both in terms of resource use and 
national rather than EU-wide policy and regulation, with competitive 
advantage emphasised.. Priority areas are energy efficiency , decentralised 
renewables , some nuclear and local CCS. 
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National Champions 
This storyline emphasises path dependent development in the EU, with 
national interests and incumbent businesses maintaining their positions as 
key actors in system development. The emphasis in this storyline is on cost 





The aim and design of each of these varies, and reflects the differing strategic priorities of each of the 
organisations. However, the storylines have in common the key theme of the complexity of ongoing 
governance arrangements if system change is to be achieved at the scale and rate required to meet climate 
change commitments.  
The ability to outline and unpick the governance arrangements over time is one of the key strengths of the 
qualitative scenario approach. For this reason the technique was selected to explore how one key governance 
arrangement – renewable energy auctions – might develop (and be developed) over time under different 
conditions of system development up to 2050. Changes in electricity systems and markets will lead to 
different options for supporting renewables, or other forms of generation. If RE auctions continue into the 
future, current models are likely to co-evolve with these broader changes and what we expect of an auction 
– who bids, who auctions, what is auctioned – is likely to be very different in 2030/2050. 
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3 Methods and data 
The use of qualitative inputs into scenarios are useful as a means to analyse complex systems where there 
are high degrees of uncertainty and inputs cannot easily be quantified (Börjeson et al. 2006; C. A. Varum and 
Melo 2010). There is no one clear methodology for the production of qualitative scenarios, and they all vary 
in the degree of emphasis and detail given to the different aspects (MacKay and Stoyanova 2017; Rounsevell 
and Metzger 2010). However, at a high level, there are a number of common steps in scenario production 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: qualitative scenario production process 
Narrative scenario processes tend to be built on expert and/or stakeholder input and judgement, particularly 
in the early stages of the process (Ernst et al. 2018; Rounsevell and Metzger 2010). In large part this is to 
ensure that the resulting scenarios are (Wilson 1998): 
 Plausible (there is enough evidence to assume that they can happen (Wiek et al. 2013)) 
 Consistent (there are no intrinsic internal inconsistencies and/or contradictions) 
 Useful and relevant (they should contribute to decision making about the future) 
 Challenging/novel (they should challenge conventional thinking about the future) 
 Differentiated (each should be structurally different rather than variations of each other) 
For this project, the general scenario scope was developed and presented in the original AURES-II project 
proposal. Building on this, project partners worked together to identify key system drivers at a workshop in 
Vienna in November 2019. Using these insights, the University of Exeter produced this short briefing outlining 
four possible storylines for discussion and development at a stakeholder event (webinar) at the beginning of 
October 2020. 
The webinar was attended by 35 people, of whom 28 were external stakeholders. A breakdown of their roles 
is in Appendix 1. Attendees were asked a series of high level questions on the assumptions in the scenarios 
designed to give a broad indication of their validity. The results are in Appendix 1. Although there was some 
disagreement with some of the assumptions, we believe that the high proportion of respondents that agreed 
with the statements broadly validates the scenarios. In addition, Question 3 tested the level of support for 
Scenario 
scope
• Identification of 
key questions to 
be addressed
Key drivers
• Identification of the key 
issues which will 
influence the future 
development of the 
electricity system
Outcomes
• Different outcomes 
produced by 




• Based on key 
outcomes, create 
plausible narrative 
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Wilson’s criteria for defensible scenarios – ie that they should be plausible, consistent, useful, novel and 
distinct (Wilson 1998). There was no disagreement with this, although the level of support for these criteria 
varied between respondents. Again, we believe that this validates the scenarios.  
In addition, a link to an online questionnaire was placed on the draft report’s website as well as being sent to 
all webinar participants and AURES II project partners. The questionnaire was designed to allow participants 
to provide feedback on key assumptions in the report and where possible provide qualitative freeform 
suggestions for improvement and was based on Wilson’s (1998) criteria for defensible scenarios outlined 
above. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2. 
Input from the webinar and questionnaire was be used to test the plausibility of the scenarios and add detail 
to the different implications of each storyline for the future development of renewable energy auctions. 
We have chosen to adopt the 2x2 matrix approach which develops four separate storyline quadrants (Godet 
2000; Schwartz 1997). Although this approach could be considered minimalist in the sense that it only 
concentrates on two key uncertainties it was considered appropriate for practical reasons (project 
constraints) as well as being the approach used effectively in other scenario exercises examining energy 
system development (Crespo Del Granado et al. 2019; National Grid 2019). 
While our scenario analysis is essentially descriptive (ie it sets out a range of possible futures and aims to 
examine broad trends), the inclusion of EU decarbonisation targets as a given means that there is a normative 
aspect constraining electricity system development. 
The figure below outlines the milestones in this particular scenario development process, highlighting the 
role of this document (marked with *) in the process. Note that the process has been substantially revised 
from that originally conceived due to the ongoing constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 























October 2020: Final 
report
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4 Scenarios for the future of auctions 
This task aims to define four possible qualitative scenarios for the future electricity system. They will explore 
how important factors may shape renewable electricity routes to market, and the possible role of renewable 
energy auctions, broadly defined, in each scenario.  
Narrative scenarios are often used as a way of stimulating thinking about the implications of different 
decisions at business or government level. Narrative scenarios are not predictions of the future, but rather 
plausible stories of how an uncertain future might develop based on key, observable drivers such as different 
policy and regulatory design. The aim of this task is to provide a framework to inform policy makers, business 
and other stakeholders about how decisions taken now on market and network design and operation might 
play out for the future of renewables. 
The aim is to develop narrative, qualitative scenarios to describe plausible visions of what EU electricity 
markets and networks might look like in the period 2030 to 2050, based on emerging developments in 
different scales of electricity markets and networks. The first step is the definition of a framework for scenario 
definition based on the intersection of two conceptual axes. Each axis represents high-level system 
properties, where the ‘system’ includes diverse factors such as decision-making, generation, and consumer 
behaviour and network regulation. Each of the quadrants delineated by the intersecting axes consequently 
represents a distinct future ‘world’ in which the electricity system has evolved along a unique pathway.  
The objective of this exercise is to select axes such that each scenario encompasses different but plausible 
implications for the profitability of renewable technologies, and thus for the rate at which they might be viable 
without subsidy and the likely participants in the auction process (both bidders and auctioneers). 
The following figures outline the drivers, themes and possible axes that were identified at an AURES II 
consortium workshop held in November 2019. Participants were asked to first identify potential drivers of 
change relevant to the role of RES auctions. Secondly, they grouped drivers into themes for change, and 
finally they proposed some combinations of independent axes that could be used to describe scenarios that 
can contribute to understanding our research questions.  
 
Figure 3: Long list of 'drivers' of electricity system change relevant to RES auctions 
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5 Two dimensions 
 
From the preliminary consortium workshop, it became clear that the future of RES auctions will be shaped 
by socio-political factors, as well as technical and economic developments. Some trends operate at the 
macro-level, for example the overall direction of EU integration. While other are far more electricity sector-
specific, for example innovation in new storage technologies and regulation. 
The backbone of the scenarios framework is the selection of two ‘driving forces’ that are intended to be: 
i) Decisive – we can be confident that differences in how these phenomena turn out will be 
significant for our research question. I.e. they will strongly determine the future of auctions; 
ii) Uncertain – to realise the greatest analytical benefit, it is important the driving forces can 
plausibly develop along a range of divergent pathways; and 
iii) Independent – to provide four contrasting ‘worlds’ the drivers should be represent different 
domains. That is to say that we should be confident that one driver is not a sub-phenomenon of 
another, or that they might both be the result of some third cause; (van ’t Klooster and van Asselt 
2006) 
Bearing these goals in these mind, we propose as our choice of axes the extent of ‘decentralisation’ and 
increased system ‘flexibility’ over the coming decades as the key dimensions of differentiation between 
scenarios. These drivers in particular address both technological and social change, but differ markedly in 
which is the source of innovation leading change, and which must adapt to change: 
Flexibility  Technological innovation, social adaptation 
(De)centralisation  Social innovation, technological adaptation 
5.1 Axis 1: flexibility 
Flexibility in the electricity system can be seen as the capability to adapt, over various spatial and temporal 
ranges, to changes in supply or demand, in order to maintain functionality. Increased flexibility is widely seen 
as an important means of accommodating large volumes of renewable electricity production (Lund et al. 
2015; Nicolosi 2010; Papaefthymiou et al. 2018). Greater flexibility may be the result of numerous innovations 
within the electricity sector including new technology uptake, market design, regulation, network operation, 
and consumer behaviour. It may also rely on greater interaction between the electricity sector and the heat 
and transport systems, potentially through electrification of these systems (Lund et al. 2015; Pilpola and Lund 
2019; Teng et al. 2016). Papaefthymiou et al. (Papaefthymiou et al. 2018) outline numerous indicators of 
electricity system flexibility across fourteen domains of flexibility, shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Flexibility indicators as presented by Papaefthymiou et al. (Papaefthymiou et al. 2018) 
 
5.1.1 Indicators 
A scenario with high flexibility can be characterised by alignment with many or all of the indicators above in 
all of the flexibility categories. In contrast, a scenario in which the system exhibits low flexibility is 
characterised by poor alignment with most or all of these indicators and is only evident in some categories. 
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5.2 Axis 2: decentralisation 
The topic of energy system decentralisation, both of physical infrastructure and of the human structures that 
govern the electricity system, has long been a major part of discussions about the transition to sustainability 
(Brisbois 2020). More dispersed governance is also associated with greater active participation by 
consumers and citizens through, for example, prosumerism, captured by the concept of ‘energy democracy’ 
(Szulecki 2018). However, there remain numerous uncertainties and contestations (Stefes 2020). While 
questions remain about “what is being decentralised, by whom” (Judson et al. 2020), there is broad 
acceptance that diffusion from the centre towards the periphery in three broad domains will have significant 
implications for the future electricity system. We determine that these domains are: 
1. Energy production/ electricity generation 
2. Decision making and authority 
3. Ownership and participation 
5.2.1 Indicators 
A scenario with low levels of decentralisation, therefore, can be characterised by: 
 A large preponderance of large, transmission connected electricity production and associated 
network architecture; 
 A generally top-down mode of decision making and low levels of local autonomy in relation to 
decisions about electricity systems  
 Low levels of individual participation and community level ownership of system assets 
A scenario with high levels of decentralisation, meanwhile, can be characterised by: 
 A high degree of distributed, embedded and small-scale electricity production, often from renewable 
sources; 
 A generally local and bottom-up mode of decision making in matters of electricity systems 
Large amounts of direct participation through, e.g., community ownership of plant, or auto-generation 
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6 Four scenarios 
The two conceptual axes outlined in the previous section delineate and name four possible energy scenarios, 
as illustrated in Figure 7, below. 
 
Figure 7: Scenario framework overview 
While the scenarios differ along the flexibility and decentralisation axes – and therefore in many indicators – 
to enable comparison, we assume the following fundamental outcomes and trends are common to all four: 
1. The top-line EU targets for energy efficiency, renewable energy and decarbonisation are met or 
exceeded for 20302; 
2. In line with the EU’s commitment to achieve ‘climate neutrality’ by 2050 and the terms of the Paris 
agreement, member states’ are assumed to collectively reduce greenhouse gas emission by at least 
95% compared to 1990 levels by 2050; 
3. It is assumed that popular support for climate policy, including energy policy, is strong and growing 
between now and 2050 as the manifestations of climate change become increasingly apparent – as 
a consequence, ‘political will’ to enact climate policy is adequate to fulfil the goals above 
In the following sections we outline the characteristics (based on the indicators outlined in the previous 
section) and accompanying storyline for each of the four scenarios in turn.  
We also provide some discussion about the likely implications of each for RES auctions focused on the route 
to market for renewable electricity.  
Specifically, we identify: 
1. The source of revenue and destination of risk, i.e. whether offtake and revenue risk is borne by the 
public or private sector,  
2. the mode of exchange, i.e. whether an auction or other market arrangement is in place; and  
3. whether auctions are private, public, or regulated. 
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To illustrate various models, we use a pictorial representation with the following components: 
 
Privately organised auction 
 
Publically organised auction 
 Flow of revenue (and/or revenue security) 
 Regulatory input 
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6.1 Top-down tech (High flexibility, low decentralisation) 
6.1.1 Characteristics 
 National or transnational governance 
 Active transmission system management 
 Greater demand-side response 
 Accurate valuation of system services 
 Large role for technology companies 
 RES-compatible, national or trans-national markets 
 Incumbent firms dominate 
 
6.1.2 Storyline 
In this scenario, significant technological innovation and implementation of new technologies enables 
efficient operation of the electricity system. Top-down planning at the national and European levels allows 
significant flexibility through sector coupling, e-mobility and electrification of heat services. Smart consumer 
appliance technology and advanced data analytics allows significant demand-side response and large-scale 
markets are able to accurately value a range of system services. 
Large-scale generation remains the primary source of renewable electricity, owned by a small number of 
national and increasingly multi-national utility companies. While business model innovation has taken place, 
particularly in the aggregation of production, data analytics and balancing services markets, the dominant 
utilities retain ownership of both the firms and the assets. Large technology companies play a large role in 
forecasting and shaping consumer behaviour to better manage the system. Community renewables projects 
remain a niche model for generation with routes to market for renewable electricity presenting high risks and 
barriers to entry for small actors.  
6.1.3 Implications for RES auctions 
Large-scale renewable electricity generation is the mainstream. Ownership of generation projects tends to 
be by either large, vertically integrated utility companies, or internationally active specialist developers. 
System flexibility means that wholesale electricity markets are able to accurately value renewable generation 
allowing investment without public policy support, leading to an increase in ‘merchant’ generation. 
Nevertheless, significant auctioning takes place for new and repowered generation assets but the profile of 
the auctioneers differs. Instead of government led auctions, they are instead held both by utility companies 
and by major consuming industries. With little regulatory intervention in auction design, however, the 
auctions’ risk profiles all but exclude all but the largest and most sophisticated bidders. 
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Figure 10: An auction system in which private (or corporate) PPAs are auctioned with little or no public or 
regulatory input. 
6.2 Shiny happy energy citizens (high flexibility, high 
decentralisation) 
6.2.1 Characteristics 
 Local governance 
 Active distribution system management 
 Greater demand-side response 
 Accurate valuation of system services 
 RES-compatible, local markets 
 Broad participation (actor diversity) 
 
6.2.2 Storyline 
In this scenario, technological innovation is accompanied by a shift in governance as participation by 
consumers and citizens increases towards the ideals of ‘energy democracy’. The boundaries between the 
supply-side and the demand-side of the electricity market are blurred by the rise of widespread prosumerism, 
with domestic participation across storage, transport, heat and generation. The increase in domestic and 
community scale generation is accompanied and supported by local energy markets, enabled by open-
source, peer-to-peer electricity trading and distribution scale load-balancing. Network planning is necessarily 
locally-led, with the participation in decision making over new energy infrastructure a core task of community-
level organisation. 
Cooperative and mutual business models for energy production are widespread and form a substantial bulk 
of the overall generation mix in most parts of Europe. Utility business models increasingly rely on regulated 
returns from networks and other natural monopolies. Aggregation and data analytics services also become 
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subject to greater regulatory oversight to ensure consumers’ data autonomy. Large-scale renewable energy 
projects such as offshore wind farms, however, are still developed and owned by specialised national or 
international private developers. 
6.2.3 Implications for RES auctions 
Diversity is the defining characteristic in this scenario. Electricity wholesale markets are able to value 
products and services and to allow investment in adequate generation without additional public revenue 
support. However, a wide range of RES contractual arrangements are still closed through auction as a key 
risk-management tool. For example, large energy consuming industries seeking bilateral arrangements for 
long-term supply hold procurement auctions, although these private auctions are subject to regulatory 
oversight designed to ensure, among other things, actor diversity in generation and alignment with local 
network capacity. Auctions are also held at a variety of scales. Local public authorities contract for generation 
to meet specific renewable energy goals and local energy trading between prosumers makes use of online 
auction formats. City and local-scale auctions for non-electricity products such as domestic energy efficiency 
improvements are a crucial aspect of long-term demand management. 
 
 
Figure 11: Auction system in which privately organised auctions are subject to some degree of regulatory 
oversight of design – particularly to ensure actor and technology diversity 
6.3 Leviathan (low flexibility, low decentralisation) 
6.3.1 Characteristics 
 National or transnational governance 
 More passive, centralised networks  
 Less demand-side response 
 Poor valuation of system services 
 National or trans-national wholesale markets 
 Incumbent firms dominate 
 
6.3.2 Storyline 
In this scenario, contemporary trends towards energy system decentralisation and greater flexibility stall or 
are reversed. Governance of (and participation in) the electricity system is dominated by central public and 
private actors, most likely at the scale of the nation-state.  
Decisions about how 2050 targets are achieved are negotiated between governments and a small number 
of industrial elites on a corporatist basis. The electricity value chain is oligopolistic and dominated by a small 
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number of national or regional companies. Citizen-led investment is almost impossible within the legal and 
financial framework. 
In this rigid and top-down scenario, lack of innovation in system-optimisation technologies means that 
consumer participation in the energy system is low with little expansion of demand-side flexibility and few 
opportunities for prosumerism. 
Innovation in electricity market frameworks is also poor, leading to poor valuation of system services and 
few business models viable outside the utility mould. However, demand for new RES capacity to meet targets 
means that there is scope for ‘wildcat’ project developers to finance and develop new generation projects 
either on the basis of a PPA or equity sale on completion. 
Over time, utility incomes become increasingly volatile due to growing RES shares, leading to the 
implementation of wide-ranging subsidy schemes to mitigate the “utility death spiral” (Castaneda et al. 2017). 
In some countries, (re)nationalisation of companies is deemed necessary to maintain security of energy 
supply. 
 
6.3.3 Implications for RES auctions 
The risks of participation in electricity supply (low, volatile prices) are such that almost all new renewable 
capacity and increasing volumes of existing capacity is under the direct control of the electricity utility 
oligopoly, many of which are loss-making enterprises. Where private development takes place projects are 
often sold in their entirety to the utilities. In some cases, pressure to meet targets for renewables leads to 
auctions for new capacity, which is auctioned and remunerated on a PPA basis. In some cases, utilities are 
legally compelled by regulators to hold specific format auctions. 
Approaching 2050, the political pressure to comply with climate obligations for some countries becomes so 
strong to expand production generous FiT programmes are introduced and land-use restrictions relaxed, 
leading to a ‘gold rush’ in renewable resources. 
 
Figure 12: Auction system in which private corporations are legally compelled to increase procurement of 
RES auctions through mandated auction programmes 
 
Figure 13: The return of the FiT 
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6.4 Make-do-and-mend (low flexibility, high decentralisation) 
6.4.1 Characteristics 
 Local governance 
 More passive, but locally planned networks 
 Less demand-side response but strong incentives to reduce demand through EE 
 Poor valuation of system services 
 Local markets  
 Broad participation (actor diversity) 
 
6.4.2 Storyline 
In this scenario, there is a strong divergence between stuttering technical innovation and very active social 
innovation. Failure to commercialise key flexibility technologies in the heat, transport and large-scale battery 
storage sectors, and wide-spread rejection of in-home technologies for enhanced energy management due 
to concerns about privacy and autonomy constrains the degree of technical system flexibility. At the same 
time, attempts to reinforce transmission and distribution networks to better cope with rising RES share meet 
with widespread local resistance. Consequently, the mainstream electricity system becomes increasingly 
unpopular, with rising prices and an inability to meet consumer expectations leading to widespread 
dissatisfaction. 
Nevertheless, an empowered and enabled community energy sector sees a large increase in prosumerism 
and the emergence of locally planned microgrids and, in some places, local peer-to-peer energy markets. 
Consumers’ and citizens’ direct participation in these projects, planning decisions, and markets contributes 
to a greater awareness of energy use and an attendant development of energy conservation norms. Sharp 
reductions in energy consumption coupled with a declining share of revenues from energy sales in the 
mainstream energy system creates a virtuous cycle of increasing energy efficiency, greater awareness of 
time-of-use and increasing renewable energy production at the local scale. At the same time, locally 
organised energy groups begin to self-organise and, in some cases, create larger regional-scale syndicates 
of community owned enterprises that can raise finance to develop and build commercial scale and even 
large scale RES projects. As with the Leviathan storyline, there is a strong risk of a utility death spiral as 
consumers and communities rely increasingly on their own production. 
6.4.3 Implications for RES auctions 
The declining role of centralised decision-making in the energy sphere means that there is little requirement 
for auctions to elicit market interest in participation in building RES capacity. However, local and community-
scale actors may play an increased role on the demand-side, aggregating output from various sources 
including RES installations. This type of activity could result in contracting forms that may be called 
‘community PPAs’, similar in structure to the corporate PPA model. 
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7 Analysis: pathways and implications for RES auctions 
Across the four scenarios sketched out above, there are four basic routes to market envisaged: 
1. Public RES auction guaranteeing supplements to private revenues 
2. Corporate or community PPA 
3. Return of the feed-in tariff 
4. Merchant contracting 
While each of our four scenarios may be more conducive to one of the four routes to market, as discussed 
in section 6, we do not propose that any of these are likely to be the only model for buying and selling 
renewable electricity in a particular scenario (nor, for that matter, do we suggest that any of them are 
inevitable or even that they are more likely than alternatives). However, in order to consider how RES 
contracting in general, and auctions in particular, may develop between now and 2030 and 2050 the 
following sections examines each model in turn to speculate about some of the milestones that may lead 
to its preponderance in Europe in 2030. 
7.1 Public RES auction guaranteeing supplements to private 
revenues 
This model is the current ‘state of the art’ in 2020. In order for it to remain the dominant model for RES 
contracting, two conditions would need to persist: 
i) The sales revenue available to RES producers is not adequate (from the perspective of price 
and/or risk) to finance projects and/or; 
ii) Central public authorities deem ‘steering’ of RES capacity additions necessary on technological 
(which technologies are financeable), spatial (where projects are built), temporal (e.g. matching 
RES build to network expansion), or qualitative (e.g. local content requirements)  
The first point suggests that technological cost-reduction slows or stalls, or that electricity (and carbon) 
markets cannot be reformed in such a way as to allow appropriate risk hedging by RES producers. Given than 
in many European markets RES technologies such as onshore wind are already cost competitive against 
fossil fuel generation, this outcome is more likely to be a result of regulatory rather than technological factors. 
The second point suggests that government intervention in RES markets intensifies rather than diminishes 
over the coming decade. The reasons for this may be industrial policy decisions to promote domestic supply 
chains (subject to state-aid restrictions) or a highly coordinated approach to RES expansion, possibly 
resulting from time-pressure due to delayed target fulfilment. 
7.2 Corporate or community PPA 
Private contracts for RES output are an increasingly visible part of the energy landscape. In many (but not 
all) cases these contracts are let through competitive tendering processes – essentially private RES 
auctions. These tenders differ from conventional RES auctions in that they are designed as an explicit 
procurement process rather than a revenue support allocation, but the essential structure remains the 
same. The primary advantages of arranging these PPA contracts through tenders are cost discovery and 
reducing the transactions costs through up-front standardisation of terms that would otherwise require 
substantial bilateral negotiation and associated legal and other professional costs. 
Whether this model becomes dominant depends on three factors: 
i) Energy buyers’ perception of the value of non-market value of RES (i.e. reputation/CSR) 
ii) Producer and consumer appetite for benefits of PPAs (long-term price stability) vis a vis 
alternatives – if wholesale markets do not offer sufficient risk management possibilities, 
producers may value long-term revenue certainty more highly 
iii) Balance sheet constraints – in many jurisdictions, accounting rules require PPAs to be treated 
as a lease liability with knock-on implications for reporting, profitability etc. 
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The case for direct contracting between consumers and producers is therefore complex and dynamic. In 
general, however, we can say that the inadequacy of alternative means of managing risk through wholesale 
electricity trading is a likely prerequisite. 
In such circumstances that the CPPA becomes the de facto standard model for RES contracting, it is possible 
to imagine an increased role for regulation of the arrangements. For example through standardised terms, 
quotas for certain types of consumer or geographical region based on a register of contracts, offtake 
volumes, or changes to accounting rules. Indeed, many current CPPAs include a regulated component in the 
form of certificates or other associated revenue stream bundled with the electricity. 
7.3  Return of the feed-in tariff 
The dominant model for public policy intervention to promote RES expansion before the increased use of 
auctions was the feed-in tariff (FIT). In many places it remains in place to support smaller-scale projects. The 
defining characteristic of the FIT is that decisions about the revenues available to producers are taken outside 
the market. Decisions about pricing, priority dispatch and the duration of contracts are all made my 
policymakers. For the FIT to replace current RES auctions would require: 
i) Failure of other available routes to market to enable sufficiently rapid RES growth to meet 
climate targets (perhaps an emergency need to very rapidly ‘take the brakes off’ deployment 
ii) And a willingness to intervene in investment patterns (which, given the nature of contemporary 
auction design is not such a leap) but also to take on the economic and political risk associated 
with pricing decisions which could well be higher than previous auction outcomes 
7.4 Merchant contracting 
For merchant contracting to become the norm for new RES projects, investors would need to have 
confidence that wholesale markets can provide adequate revenue and risk hedging. Markets would need very 
high levels of liquidity and the overall electricity system would need to be extremely flexible to allow accurate 
reflection of marginal costs in prices. Given the nature of most RES projects, however (zero marginal cost, 
high capital cost) it is likely that producers will seek out long-term contracts such as those offered by RES 
auctions, CPPAs or feed-in tariffs. We argue, therefore, that even where wholesale markets could enable 
investment, some form of longer term alternative is likely to become available – although novel contracting 
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8 Conclusions 
 
How producers realise a return on investment in RES generation is changing and will continue to change. To-
date, public policy has played a significant role in determining how revenues and risks are structured and 
how they are accessed. While the contemporary large-scale RES auction marks a substantial shift in how 
public intervention is organised, it has not notably reduced the scope of the intervention. Still, in most places, 
some form of policy, auction or otherwise, is deemed necessary to enable projects to be financed. While there 
are notable developments such as increased use of corporate PPAs and some merchant generation, by-and-
large national-scale policy support represents the mainstream. 
There are also other signs that the accepted model of auctions for renewables is shifting. For example, recent 
auction rounds in several countries have led to contracts being awarded which are below market price, 
indicating that the value of the agreement is increasingly found in revenue reliability, rather than in a premium 
price for output. What is auctioned is also changing, notably in relation to recent auctions for access to 
specified areas of the seabed for offshore wind projects in both the US and UK (Crown Estate 2019; 
Department of the Interior Bureau of Ocean Management 2014). 
Our scenarios show that the status quo model of RES auctions is unlikely to be the dominant route to market 
by 2030 unless progress in transforming and pluralising energy systems stalls leading to something like our 
‘leviathan’ scenario. That is not to say, though, that the withdrawal of support instruments of all kinds is 
inevitable, as is sometimes argued. A fully merchant model for RES investment may be possible in a highly 
flexible system and reformed wholesale trading arrangements, but perhaps alongside other forms of private 
contracting such as innovative forms of PPA. 
That is not to say that the RES auction will disappear entirely. Private, municipal, or community tenders for 
PPAs, are likely to grow in importance, requiring new and innovative auctions designs that minimise 
transactions costs. The lessons learned though Europe’s roll-out of national scale support auctions may be 
valuable here. 
Finally, given both the urgency of the challenge of tackling climate change and the challenges of coordinating 
RES build out with supply chain development and grid expansion, a regulatory role of some kind exists in all 
scenarios. Whether it is standardising auctions models and contracts or directing geographical density, 
public policy will continue to play a role in the buying and selling of renewable electricity for the foreseeable 
future. 
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Appendix 1: Webinar on the Future of Renewable Energy 
Auctions (7 October 2020) 
Profile of external attendees 
The webinar was attended by 35 people, of whom 28 were external to the AURES II project. The breakdown 
by sectors shows that the majority of these external stakeholders were from industry. 
 












Webinar participants by sector
Yes; 81%
No; 19%
1. Flexibility is a decisive factor in the future 













2. Decentralisation is a decisive factor in the future 










Completely Mostly Somewhat Not really Not at all
3. Do you find the scenarios meet the criteria of plausibility, consistency, 




4. Are the four high-level routes to market for RES in 
2030 reasonable (public RES auctions, cPPAs, FIT, 
merchant contracting)?
n = 17 
  






5. A high-level finding is that auctions in some form will be 
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